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 LEGAL PLURALISM AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
AFTER CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF CEDAW 
Meghan Campbell* & Geoffrey Swenson** 
ABSTRACT 
Protecting and promoting women’s rights is an immense 
challenge after conflict, especially when the capacity of the state’s 
legal system is limited and non-state justice systems handle most 
disputes. However, legal pluralism’s implications for gender equality 
remain under-theorized, as is CEDAW’s potential to improve women’s 
rights in these settings. This Article offers a theoretical framework to 
help understand the varying relationships between state and        
non-state justice. It also proposes strategies for interacting with 
different types of legal pluralisms that will allow the CEDAW 
Committee to more effectively promote gender equality in legally 
pluralistic, post-conflict states, as is illuminated in case studies from 
Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Advancing the rule of law and promoting human rights are 
cornerstones of post-conflict reconstruction. 1  The reconstruction 
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1.  See generally ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR'S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER 
CIVIL CONFLICT (2004) (describing the challenges of post-conflict reconstruction). 
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period after conflict is also an opportune moment to embed gender 
equality within the state. Achieving these aims is inherently complex. 
The degree of complexity increases when more than one legal system 
operates within a state’s territorial boundaries, particularly when 
non-state systems enjoy substantial independence from the state. In 
post-conflict settings, the state justice sector’s capacity can be 
severely limited and its legitimacy questionable. The non-state justice 
systems, such as customary suco councils in Timor-Leste and 
Pashtunwali in Afghanistan, almost invariably handle a majority of 
disputes, often retaining substantial autonomy and authority.2 It is 
estimated that non-state justice mechanisms settle eighty to ninety 
percent of disputes in developing countries.3  Despite the immense 
importance of legal pluralism, the challenges it raises in realizing 
gender equality in post-conflict environments remain only 
superficially recognized and largely under-theorized. The non-state 
justice sector can be a strong partner in promoting women’s rights or 
it can significantly undermine the reconstruction process, even going 
so far as to risk a return to conflict. 
While there are many different legal instruments in which to 
situate the relationship among gender equality, legal pluralism, and 
post-conflict states,4 this Article argues for an expanded role for the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW).5 Although CEDAW only binds the state, 
the treaty and the CEDAW Committee can play an overlooked but 
vital role in ensuring women are able to equally access justice in 
legally pluralistic post-conflict states. The CEDAW Committee’s 
recommendations on the role of non-state justice can guide domestic 
law and influence both international and domestic civil society 
organizations involved in the reconstruction process. CEDAW is of 
particular importance because of its unique and detailed 
understanding of how gender relations impact women’s rights, 
including the right to access justice.6 Problematically, CEDAW and 
                                                                                                                                        
2.  See Peter Albrecht & Helene Maria Kyed, Justice and Security: When 
the State Isn't the Main Provider, DIIS 3 (2010). 
3.  Id. at 1; THOMAS J. BARFIELD ET AL., THE CLASH OF TWO GOODS: STATE 
AND NON-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AFGHANISTAN 3 (2006). 
4.  Including, for example, the U.N. Security Council Resolution on Women, 
Peace and Security. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1325 (Oct. 31, 2000) (urging a wide variety 
of ways to increase the role of women in governments and U.N. activities). 
5.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force 
Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
6.  Id. at art. 5. 
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the CEDAW Committee’s current approach to the opportunities and 
challenges of legal pluralism in post-conflict states is underdeveloped 
and largely incoherent. This Article offers a theoretical framework to 
help understand the multifaceted and often fragile relationship 
between the state and non-state sector. It proposes a series of 
strategies suited to different types of legal pluralisms that the 
CEDAW Committee can draw on for promoting women’s rights in 
legally pluralistic, post-conflict states. 
Part I canvasses the unique challenges women face in 
accessing justice in legally pluralistic, post-conflict states. Part II 
argues that on the basis of human rights law and empirical reality it 
is necessary to ensure that the non-state justice sector upholds 
women’s rights. Part III proposes paradigms to help conceptualize the 
relationship between state and non-state justice and offers strategies 
which correspond to the type of legal pluralism present in the state. 
Part IV analyses the text of CEDAW and demonstrates it is an 
evolutionary instrument designed to address gender equality in 
legally pluralistic, post-conflict states. This part also argues for the 
important role that CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee can play in 
the reconstruction process. Part V demonstrates that the CEDAW 
Committee has a theoretically rudimentary approach to gender 
equality in legally pluralistic, post-conflict states. The Article 
concludes by arguing that the proposed theoretical framework offers 
both a nuanced and rigorous structure that the CEDAW Committee 
can employ to make meaningful and authoritative recommendations. 
 
I. GENDER EQUALITY AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN POST-CONFLICT 
ENVIRONMENTS 
Before assessing the role of CEDAW, it is essential to 
appreciate the challenges women face in accessing justice in legally 
pluralistic post-conflict environments. This section begins by defining 
legal pluralism and briefly recounts the historical context of legal 
pluralism in Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. It then proceeds to argue, 
against the backdrop of legal pluralism in these two states, that it is 
crucial for efforts aimed at establishing gender equality to grasp the 
nature of and relationship between state and non-state justice in 
post-conflict scenarios. 
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A. Defining Legal Pluralism 
Legal pluralism denotes a situation where “two or more legal 
systems coexist in the same social field.”7 It has a long historical 
pedigree8 and exists everywhere from localized communities to the 
international system. 9  Legal pluralism tends to be rooted in the 
state’s historical and political context and as such, there is no 
standardized relationship between the state and non-state system.10 
Legal pluralism has been defined in numerous ways.11 Definitions are 
almost always rooted in idealized notions of how the state and      
non-state justice systems should operate. “Legal pluralism” is used 
here as an umbrella term to capture states where there are multiple 
forms of binding dispute resolution. Legal pluralism has major 
implications for human rights when non-state justice systems possess 
a meaningful degree of autonomy from state authorities. 
There is further disagreement on how to refer to non-state 
justice systems, reflecting pre-judgments about the importance and/or 
legitimacy of the non-state system. The legal rules and procedures 
relied upon by the non-state system may be drawn from religious 
legal systems, indigenous or customary codes, traditions, community 
arbitration, codified civil law, or other alternative dispute settlement 
procedures.12 Consequentially, non-state justice is often referred to as 
informal, traditional, or customary law. However, these terms might 
not capture the empirical reality. Informal systems can, in practice, 
be highly formalised. Ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan draw on a     
non-state system based on longstanding cultural beliefs, 
Pashtunwali, known for its complexity, formality, and 
                                                                                                                                        
7.   Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 
(1988). 
8.   LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: LEGAL REGIMES IN 
WORLD HISTORY, 1400-1900 2–3 (2002). 
9.    PAUL BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 4–5 (2012). 
10.  See generally JOEL MIGDAL, STRONG SOCIETIES AND WEAK STATES 
(1988) (examining a variety of outcomes between the state and non-state societal 
forces such as local strongmen). 
11.  Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. of the Working Grp. on the Issue of 
Discrimination Against Women in Law and in Practice, ¶¶ 14, 44, U.N. Doc 
A/HRC/26/39 (Apr. 1, 2014) [hereinafter Discrimination Against Women in ESC 
Life]; U.N. Women, Progress of the World’s Women: In Pursuit of Justice 66 
(2010) [hereinafter Progress of the World’s Women]. 
12.  See John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. OF LEGAL 
PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal 
Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 375, 396 (2008) 
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comprehensiveness.13 On the other hand, the state legal system can 
be highly ad hoc, and state officials may disregard or may not even 
know the relevant law. 14  Rather than drawing an unhelpful 
distinction between formal and informal/traditional/customary, 
classifying justice as either state or non-state offers substantial 
advantages. The state/non-state distinction is value-neutral 
regarding content and outcomes. It avoids the linguistic baggage 
associated with terms such as “informal,” “traditional,” or 
“customary,” which inherently involve empirical and often normative 
claims. For instance, how long does a system have to be in place 
before it qualifies as traditional? Relying on the state/non-state 
classification avoids these pitfalls while at the same time providing a 
neutral and more accurate description. 
1. A Case Study in Post-Conflict Legal Pluralism: 
Afghanistan and Timor-Leste 
The assessment of accessing justice in post-conflict scenarios 
is situated within state rebuilding efforts in two highly legally 
pluralist states: Afghanistan and Timor-Leste. 15  Although 
illustrations are drawn from these two states, they contain features 
that are common to many states seeking to re-establish the justice 
system after conflict. This subsection provides a brief historical 
analysis of legal pluralism in both these two states. 
Afghanistan and Timor-Leste are illuminating examples of 
legal pluralism in post-conflict environments. Portugal held East 
Timor as a colony for over four centuries, during which legal order 
hinged on tactical alliances between Portuguese colonial officials and 
non-state authorities with little concern for women’s rights.16 After 
                                                                                                                                        
13.  See OLIVIER ROY, ISLAM AND RESISTANCE IN AFGHANISTAN 35 (2nd 
ed. 1990). 
14.  Afghanistan Laws, Afghanistan Justice Organization (Oct. 2, 2016), 
http://www.afghanjustice.org/Afghanistan-Laws. 
15.  See, e.g., ROD NIXON, JUSTICE AND GOVERNANCE IN EAST TIMOR: 
INDIGENOUS APPROACHES AND THE “NEW SUBSISTENCE STATE” (2012) 
(discussing governance challenges through a caste study of Timor-Leste); Ali 
Wardak & John Braithwaite, Crime and War in Afghanistan: Part II: A 
Jeffersonian Alternative?, 53 BRIT. J. OF CRIMINOLOGY 197 (2013) (discussing 
rural republicanism in Afghanistan and its connection to local community and 
state justice). 
16.  See generally GEOFFREY ROBINSON, "IF YOU LEAVE US HERE, WE WILL 
DIE": HOW GENOCIDE WAS STOPPED IN EAST TIMOR (2010) (offering a first person 
account of the 1999 East Timor attempt to gain independence from Indonesia). 
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the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Marcello Caetano in 
Portugal in 1974, a rapid and haphazard decolonization process 
commenced in East Timor. Decolonization culminated in a Timorese 
declaration of independence in November 1975. Indonesian President 
Suharto ordered the invasion of Timor-Leste on 7 December 1975 in 
violation of international law and oversaw an intense 25 year 
occupation that displayed no concern for human rights claims. 17 
During this time, most legal disputes continued to be settled through 
non-state mechanisms18 and non-state authorities were essential to 
sustaining the resistance.19 After the Asian economic crisis led to the 
collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian regime, new Indonesian President 
B. J. Habibie agreed to a referendum on Timor-Leste’s status in 1998. 
Voters in Timor-Leste overwhelmingly supported independence. 
Shortly thereafter, pro-integrationist Indonesian militias unleashed 
systemic destruction, which eventually triggered the deployment of 
international peacekeepers in September 1999. Timor-Leste was 
placed under U.N. trusteeship until independence in 2002. During 
this chaotic time, non-state authorities largely maintained legal 
order, and they continue to be vital to this day. As will be discussed 
further below, while important progress is being made, women’s 
rights remain a major concern in both the state and non-state justice 
systems. 
Afghanistan’s existence is conventionally dated to the       
mid-18th century, but the constitutional era did not start until 1923. 
While women’s rights were occasionally a concern, they were rarely a 
major priority, and efforts to promote women’s rights often provoked 
backlash.20 Despite increasing claims to be a constitutional state, in 
practice, state power largely rested on its relationships with religious 
and tribal authority. 21  The most effective form of legal order was 
                                                                                                                                        
17.  See Roger S. Clark, The “Decolonization” of East Timor and the United 
Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression, 7 YALE J. OF WORLD PUB. 
ORD. 2, 2–44 (1980). 
18.  Dionisio Babo Soares, Challenges for the Future, in OUT OF THE ASHES: 
DESTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF EAST TIMOR 262, 267 (J. J. Fox and D. 
Babo Soares eds., ANUE Press 2d ed. 2003) (2000). 
19.  Andrew McWilliam, Houses of Resistance in East Timor: Structuring 
Sociality in the New Nation, 15 ANTHROPOLOGICAL F. 27, 34–38 (2005). 
20.  LEON B. POULLADA, REFORM AND REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN, 1919–
1929: KING AMANULLAH’S FAILURE TO MODERNIZE A TRIBAL SOCIETY 80–91 
(1973). 
21.  BARNETT R. RUBIN, THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFGHANISTAN: STATE 
FORMATION AND COLLAPSE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 58–62 (2d ed. 
2002). 
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Pashtunwali, a non-state legal code that functioned as “an ideology 
and a body of common law which has evolved its own sanctions and 
institutions.”22 Pashtuns implemented this legal code through jirgas, 
while non-Pashtuns tend to use the term shuras. 23  For nearly a 
hundred years, all legitimate state-sponsored legal orders in 
Afghanistan were grounded in a combination of state performance, 
Islam, and tribal approval. The system broke down, however, when 
Communists toppled the regime in 1978 and plunged the country into 
decades of civil strife that produced appalling human rights 
violations. After the Soviets pulled out in 1989, Afghanistan went 
through a period of devastating civil war and further human rights 
violations until the Taliban established control over most of the 
county in 1996. The regime emphasized the maintenance of order, but 
had little interest in human rights and was particularly disinterested 
in women’s rights. The Taliban was overthrown by the US 
intervention in 2001. A new government was established under 
President Hamid Karzai through the 2001 Bonn Agreement. The 
regime was billed as a stark contrast to the Taliban and pledged to 
build a modern democratic state that upholds human rights norms 
and that would dramatically improve the treatment of women. Karzai 
was replaced as president after two terms by Ashraf Ghani in 2014 
after a deeply flawed election. 24  The Taliban continue to be a 
prominent and destabilizing force within Afghanistan, and the 
modern state that upholds women’s rights remains a distant goal. 
Essential similarities exist between these two post-conflict 
states. Both have a history of limited state capacity and weak central 
rule.25 The infrastructures and human resources in each state were 
devastated by conflict and there are high levels of poverty.26 Since 
                                                                                                                                        
22.  ROY, supra note 13, at 35. 
23.  USAID, AFGHANISTAN RULE OF LAW PROJECT 52 (2005). 
24.  Carlotta Gall, In Afghan Election, Signs of Systemic Fraud Cast Doubt 
on Many Votes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 
08/24/world/asia/in-afghan-election-signs-of-systemic-fraud-cast-doubt-on-many-
votes.html; Rod Norland and Declan Walsh, President Ashraf Ghani of 
Afghanistan Is Sworn In, Even as He Shares the Stage, N.Y. TIMES  
(Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/international-home/ashraf-
ghani-sworn-in-as-afghan-president.html.  
25.  See generally RUBIN, supra note 21, at 265–80 (describing limited state 
capacity and weak central rule in Afghanistan); ROBINSON, supra note 16. 
26.  See generally WORLD BANK, TIMOR-LESTE POVERTY ASSESSMENT: 
POVERTY IN A NEW NATION: ANALYSIS FOR ACTION (2003) (outlining specific 
challenges to poverty reduction in Timor-Leste); UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAM, AFGHANISTAN: NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2004) 
(describing poverty and development in Afghanistan). 
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Afghanistan and Timor-Leste established new regimes in the early 
2000s, local and international organizations have invested heavily in 
promoting effective state-run justice sectors. Regardless of these 
efforts, dispute resolution is most common through non-state 
mechanisms, including jirgas or shuras in Afghanistan27  and suco 
councils in Timor-Leste.28 
2. Accessing Justice in Post-Conflict Environments 
Post-conflict situations often exacerbate gender inequalities.29 
For instance, there are heightened risks of gender-based violence, and 
increased prospects of HIV infection and unwanted pregnancy. 30 
Women’s “participation in decision making processes is not seen as a 
priority and may even be side-lined as incompatible with stabilization 
goals.”31 Conflict has devastated public services and infrastructure 
and “women and girls are at the front line of suffering, bearing the 
brunt of the socioeconomic dimensions.”32 After the conflict, women 
face disproportionate difficulties in claiming title to family property, 
and as a result, have no means of earning a living.33 Thus, there is an 
acute need for women to be able to access justice. The challenge of 
accessing justice is aggravated in post-conflict situations for many 
interlocking reasons. This article focuses on the profound implications 
of legal pluralism for the promotion of women’s rights in post-conflict 
societies. It is vital to grasp the state system’s limitations in 
achieving gender equality and the prevalence of non-state justice. 
i. State Justice 
Building a state judicial system committed to gender equality 
after conflict is a complicated task.34 In post-conflict environments, 
                                                                                                                                        
27.  BARFIELD ET AL., supra note 3, at 3. 
28.  SILAS EVERETT, THE ASIA FOUND., LAW AND JUSTICE IN TIMOR-LESTE 
49–52 (2008). 
29.  Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 30, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/30 (Oct. 18, 2013) 
[hereinafter General Recommendation No. 30]. 
30.  Id. ¶¶ 34–37. 
31.  Id. ¶ 43. 
32.  Id. ¶ 48. 
33.  Id. ¶ 63. 
34.  See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, STATE-BUILDING: GOVERNANCE 
AND WORLD ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2004) (documenting how the lack of 
strong institutions in developing countries hinders response to conflict); 
DOUGLASS NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A CONCEPTUAL 
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state institutions are often weak and do not protect women’s rights. 
Indeed, they often perpetuate and institutionalize discrimination 
against women.35 The state system can suffer from corruption and 
inability to implement court judgments. Unsurprisingly, the local 
populace can be “deeply distrustful of legal institutions.”36 Former 
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan reported on Timor-Leste after 
Indonesia’s departure that “local institutions, including the court 
system, have for all practical purposes ceased to function.” 37  The 
embryonic state system in Timor-Leste was plagued with problems: 
procedural due process concerns, substantial case backlogs, and 
spotty opening hours.38 While there have been improvements,39 the 
quality of justice in Timor-Leste’s state judicial system remains 
uneven. It is estimated that it takes six months to a year to resolve 
claims of gender-based violence in the state justice system in     
Timor-Leste. 40  Most troublingly, the vast majority of court 
proceedings occur in Portuguese, which less than ten percent of the 
population understands. 41  Women also face structural barriers in 
accessing the state system in Timor-Leste: distance from court 
centres, unfamiliarity with the state system, prohibitive costs, and 
cultural pressure to use the non-state system.42 
Creating a functioning state system entails more than 
passing laws. It requires “courts, judges, a bar, and enforcement 
mechanisms across the entire country.”43 This can be an immense 
                                                                                                                                        
FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 29 (2009) 
(describing how violence-plagued states transition to orders characterized by the 
impartial rule of law). 
35.  General Recommendation No. 30, supra note 29, ¶¶ 42–47. 
36.  JANE STROMSETH ET AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?: BUILDING THE 
RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 187 (2006). 
37.  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the 
Situation in East Timor, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1024 (Oct. 4, 1999). 
38.  Roland A. West, Lawyers, Guns and Money: Justice and Security 
Reform in East Timor, in CONSTRUCTING JUSTICE AND SECURITY AFTER WAR 
313, 336-38 (Charles Call ed., 2007). 
39.  SUSAN MARX, THE ASIA FOUNDATION, TIMOR-LESTE LAW AND JUSTICE 
SURVEY (2013). 
40 .  ANNIKA KOVAR, U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, CUSTOMARY LAW 
AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN TIMOR-LESTE 29 (2011).  
41.  MARX, supra note 39, at 34. 
42.  See KOVAR, supra note 40, at 28–30; see generally INT’L DEV. LAW 
ORG., ACCESSING JUSTICE: MODELS, STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICE ON 
WOMEN’S EMPOWERMENT (2013) (discussing challenges and solutions to improve 
women’s access to justice systems) [hereinafter IDLO]. 
43.  FUKUYAMA, supra note 34, at 59. 
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challenge. In Timor-Leste “all court equipment, furniture, registers, 
records, archives . . . law books, cases files, and other legal resources 
[were] dislocated or burned” in the conflict.44 Enforcing judgments 
from the state system has been particularly challenging in 
Afghanistan.45 Human resource capacity is often very low in the legal 
profession, as conflict has devastated educational and professional 
institutions that underpin the justice sector. 46  Within the state 
apparatus itself, “poorly paid state employees are weakly incentivized 
by their official salaries to follow the rules and often face little 
oversight.”47 State officials can turn into human rights abusers or can 
remain inactive when others commit abuses.48 Since the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001, Afghanistan has seemingly created the judicial 
institutional structures of a modern state. 49  However, under the 
Karzai regime the state justice system was notoriously corrupt, 
predatory, and extortionist.50 Women are particularly vulnerable due 
to their lower social standing, dependence on spouses and male 
relatives, and in extreme cases, treatment as property.51 
It is imperative not to idealize the state system’s ability to 
uphold claims for gender equality. Despite passing legislation on 
domestic violence, local officials in Timor-Leste routinely 
conceptualize domestic violence as a non-serious or private family 
matter.52 Women who wish to pursue domestic violence claims often 
find their cases referred to non-state mechanisms by local state 
                                                                                                                                        
44.  Hansjörg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial 
System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 46, 50 (2001). 
45.  See Frank Ledwidge, Justice and Counter-insurgency in Afghanistan: A 
Missing Link, 154 RUSI J. 6, 9 (2009). 
46.  Geoffrey Swenson & Eli Sugerman, Building the Rule of Law in 
Afghanistan: The Importance of Legal Education, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 130, 
145 (2011). 
47.  See Neil A. Englehart, State Capacity, State Failure, and Human 
Rights, 46 J. PEACE RES. 163, 165 (2009). 
48.  Id. 
49.  See Ali Wardak, State and Non-State Justice Systems in Afghanistan: 
The Need for Synergy, 14 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 413 (2011). 
50.  See Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for 
Collapsed and Failing States, 29 INT’L SECURITY 85, 94–95 (2004) (discussing 
Afghanistan as a country with weak governance capacity). 
51.  See Ann Wigglesworth, Community Leadership and Gender Equality: 
Experiences of Representation in Local Governance in Timor-Leste, 5 ASIAN POL. 
& POL’Y 567, 578-82 (2013). 
52.  See DEBORAH CUMMINS, THE ASIA FOUND., “AMI SEI VÍTIMA BEIBEIK”: 
LOOKING TO THE NEEDS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS 10 (2012).  
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authorities. This dynamic reflects the multifaceted nature of justice 
in post-conflict environments.53 The situation is even more dire in 
Afghanistan. Women can be jailed for “moral crimes” such as adultery 
or leaving home. Afghan women and girls are often subject to 
virginity tests administered by state officials after being accused of 
such crimes.54 Sixty-five percent of cases that involved serious levels 
of gender-based violence that were brought to the state system were 
resolved through mediation and only five percent of claims of    
gender-based violence led to criminal prosecution.55 The tragic case of 
Farkhunda Malikzada demonstrates the multiple failures of the state 
justice sector. She was beaten to death by a mob in Kabul, in front of 
police officers after she was falsely accused of burning a copy of the 
Qu’ran. Police officers “failed to arrest a number of attackers who are 
clearly identifiable in the video footage.”56 The court convicted eleven 
officers for failing to protect Malikzada but they were only sentenced 
to one year in prison.57 
Successfully rebuilding the state system hinges significantly 
on the broad social belief that the state law, at its core, is basically 
fair and legitimate.58 In post-conflict states, popular faith in state 
institutions has almost inevitably been shaken, often shattered. 
Under Indonesian occupation, the Timorese viewed courts as 
instruments of state oppression.59 In Afghanistan, state courts are 
held in the lowest regard of all state institutions due to their low 
quality and corruption.60 The inability of the state justice sector to 
take women’s rights seriously raises significant legitimacy concerns. 
Even if the state wants to rapidly reform to eliminate discrimination 
against women, this can undermine the political legitimacy of the 
                                                                                                                                        
53.  See EVERETT, supra note 28, at 32. 
54.  Heather Barr, Sexual Assault in the Name of Science, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/29/dispatches-sexual-assault-name-
science-afghanistan (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). 
55.  U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Justice Through the Eyes of 
Afghan Women (Apr. 2015), https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/ 
unama_ohchr_justice_through_eyes_of_afghan_women_-15_april_2015.pdf. 
56.  Patricia Gossman, Afghanistan’s Legal System Fails Farkhunda Again, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Mar. 9 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/09/ 
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state system. Efforts to promote gender equality have been perceived 
as abandoning traditional Afghan values. 61  Protecting women’s 
human rights through the state system necessarily involves 
constructing the popular legitimacy of new legal norms and 
institutions. 
ii. Non-State Justice Sector 
Given issues with the state system, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the non-state system often features higher levels of 
effective authority and popular legitimacy. 62  Unfortunately, the    
non-state justice system is often rife with discriminatory gender 
regulations and norms. In Afghanistan, tribal dispute resolution 
mechanisms continue to be the forum of choice, particularly in 
Pashtun tribal areas.63 In this legal system, women are excluded from 
participating in public life, unable to own property and are often 
forced into early marriage.64 The Taliban is another competing source 
of non-state justice. Although it is brutal, deeply discriminatory 
against women, and fails to uphold basic human rights, Johnson 
contends it is “acknowledged by local communities as being 
legitimate, fair, free of bribery, swift, and enduring” and their system 
“is easily one of the most popular and respected elements of the 
Taliban insurgency by local communities.”65 Taliban judges claim to 
adjudicate based on Sharia law, which “strengthens their legitimacy 
in a deeply religious population, particularly when the codes of law 
used by the state are little known, misunderstood, and sometimes 
resented.” 66  Decisions are enforced and corruption is taken 
seriously.67 The Taliban justice system seeks to provide exactly what 
the state justice system does not: predictable, effective, legitimate, 
and accessible dispute resolution. 
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In Timor-Leste, the state tends to handle major issues, 
particularly violent crimes, while most civil matters and petty crimes 
are left for local dispute resolution. In practice, the non-state 
authorities, most notably through suco councils, continue to resolve 
most disputes, including for gender-based violence and land and 
inheritance claims. 68  In most cases, the non-state system in       
Timor-Leste does not uphold fundamental principles of gender 
equality. Historically, women could not inherit land and did not 
participate in traditional decision-making institutions. 69  Although 
gender-based violence is a public crime, it is still largely resolved in 
the non-state system through compensation, undertakings not to 
reoffend, community work, public shaming, and symbolic 
reconciliation acts.70 
In conclusion, accessing justice and protecting women’s rights 
in legally pluralistic, post-conflict environments is a difficult matter. 
The state justice system is weakened after the conflict. While the 
state may pass legislation, the state often lacks the necessary human, 
financial and technical resources needed for a flourishing justice 
system. The state system may be corrupt or turn a blind eye to 
human rights abuses, particularly those facing women. In reality, the 
state system “may provide no better access to justice for 
women . . . because [it] reproduce[s] the social inequalities of the 
societies.”71 Women and the population more generally may be deeply 
distrustful of state justice. Rebuilding efforts need to be cognizant of 
the limited state capacity, domestic perceptions of the state justice 
sector, and the prominent role of the non-state system. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLED AND PRAGMATIC CASE FOR ENGAGING WITH 
NON-STATE JUSTICE 
Having established the unique challenges that exist, the 
question becomes whether there is an approach that is conducive to 
achieving gender equality in legally pluralistic, post-conflict states. 
There is a consensus that the state system needs to be reformed so 
that it protects women’s rights. The more challenging issues relate to 
non-state justice, which often reflects religious and indigenous 
cultural norms. The prevalence of non-state justice systems in      
post-conflict environments brings to the fore the fundamental tension 
between promoting universal gender equality and the “desire to 
maintain cultural diversity.” 72  Feminists disagree about how to 
approach non-state justice. This section argues based on human 
rights principles and on-the-ground realities that CEDAW and the 
CEDAW Committee must constructively engage with both the state 
and non-state justice sectors in post-conflict environments. 
At one extreme, some advocate for abolishing the non-state 
system entirely. The abolitionist approach contends the 
discriminatory procedures and norms in the non-state justice system 
cannot be overcome. Thus, gender equality can only be achieved by 
eradicating legal pluralism. Cohen forcefully argues that legal 
pluralism in the sense of multicultural or hybrid jurisdiction must be 
avoided because it creates zones where gender disadvantage is 
perpetuated.73 She argues that attempts to regulate non-state justice, 
for example, by allowing women to choose their preferred forum, are 
also problematic.74 She argues that such approaches place an undue 
burden on women to choose between gender equality and culture and 
do not account for the cultural pressure that may be exerted to choose 
the non-state system. 75  The best approach, Cohen contends, is 
indirect regulation that encourages internal reform of the non-state 
system by withholding state benefits to spur compliance with gender 
equality. 76  However, her solution is premised on a strong and 
functioning state system, which as demonstrated in Section I, rarely 
exists in the wake of conflict. 
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While abolition seems to offer an easy solution, it lacks 
nuance and is not feasible for both principled and pragmatic reasons. 
The relationship between legal pluralism and international human 
rights law is multi-faceted.77 International law “recognizes the right 
of all communities to culture and in the case of indigenous 
populations, the right to determine their own systems of law and 
justice.”78 Thus, abolishing legal pluralism may itself violate human 
rights. Regarding legal pluralism based on custom and religion, the 
international human rights framework is more complex. Quane 
observes that “there is no general requirement . . . to recognize 
religious or generally customary law within states’ domestic 
jurisdictions.”79 She notes that “instead . . . at the global level . . . a 
compelling case must be made out in the light of the particular 
circumstances of the case before the introduction of legal pluralism.”80 
Pragmatically, states often introduce or allow legal pluralism to 
acknowledge the right to religious freedom and belief and there is a 
“general consensus that legal pluralism is permissible.”81 Both U.N. 
Women and the U.N. Working Group on Discrimination Against 
Women focus on developing and promoting best practices to achieve 
gender equality in the context of legal pluralism rather than argue 
that the non-state system should be abolished.82 There can be real 
dangers in ignoring legal pluralism in efforts to achieve gender 
equality. For example, Engle’s work on gender-based violence in India 
and Fiji demonstrates that not appreciating the role and nuances of 
non-state justice can “feed into a resistant ethnic nationalism that 
attributes its problems to human rights.”83 
There are further pragmatic reasons for engaging with legal 
pluralism unique to post-conflict environments. Non-state justice 
mechanisms are almost invariably linked to powerful social groups.84 
In Timor-Leste, non-state “mechanisms provided the only point of 
stability at the local level and a quick means by which normality 
could be re-establsihed (sic)” during the initial phases after the 1998 
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independence referendum.85 Ensuring that these powerful actors are 
supportive of the state’s reconstruction efforts is important for 
rebuilding the rule of law. Non-state justice actors in                      
post-independence Timor-Leste have, for the most part, supported the 
state and worked to implement state-initiated development plans.86 
In turn, support from non-state justice actors has helped to bolster 
the state system’s credibility and effectiveness, despite the system’s 
lingering capacity issues. 
In contrast, ignoring non-state justice can risk undermining 
reconstruction efforts. Non-state judicial actors can act as           
“state-building spoilers.”87 A good example of this is the interaction 
between the state and the multiple non-state systems in Afghanistan, 
where state-building efforts have not meaningfully engaged with 
crucial tribal and religious non-state justice actors. This is a major 
error, as historically every relatively successful Afghan state judicial 
endeavour has relied on support from tribal and religious 
constituencies. 88  In part because of their exclusion from the 
reconstruction and because of the high levels of corruption within the 
state justice system, tribal and religious leaders in Afghanistan have 
reacted skeptically to the state’s assertion of judicial power.89 As a 
consequence, this has enhanced the Taliban justice system’s relative 
appeal, which emphasizes quick, predictable, and effective dispute 
resolution, even as it grossly fails to respect the rights of women.90 At 
the most extreme, non-state authorities can contribute, support and 
form the basis of violent insurgencies that fundamentally challenge 
state authority.91 
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III. UNDERSTANDING NON-STATE JUSTICE IN LEGALLY 
PLURALISTIC, POST-CONFLICT STATES 
Rather than striving to abolish non-state justice, “[w]hat 
matters is to ensure that women do get justice, no matter where they 
seek it.”92 The focus shifts on how to best structure the relationship 
between the state and non-state justice system so as to 
comprehensively ensure gender equality. There are numerous 
proposals on how to best achieve women’s rights in legally pluralistic 
societies, including: affirming the primacy of gender equality over 
non-state justice legal norms;93 ensuring gender equality is enshrined 
in the constitution;94 providing the right to appeal decisions from the 
non-state to the state system;95 limiting the role of non-state justice to 
minor civil and criminal matters;96 increasing women’s participation 
in the non-state justice system; developing state oversight 
mechanisms over the non-state justice system; 97  and empowering 
women to re-interpret non-state laws.98 The aim here is not to propose 
new measures that uniquely apply in post-conflict states. Rather this 
Article takes as its starting point that advancing these proposals 
without appreciating the different character of non-state justice 
actors (traditional leaders versus insurgency) and the diversity of 
relations that can exist between the state and non-state justice 
systems is dangerous because it risks undermining the entire 
reconstruction process. 
Legal pluralism inevitably reflects each state’s legal, political, 
and cultural history and as such is unique to each post-conflict 
scenario. Although there is no one-size-fits-all solution, this section 
highlights recurring strategies and develops a framework to 
understand how the interaction between the non-state and state 
system influences efforts to embed gender equality within the state. 
Swenson’s four distinct legal pluralism paradigms conceptualize how 
legal pluralism functions in post-conflict states.99 The four typologies 
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are: combative, competitive, cooperative, and complementary.100 He 
also posits five main strategies linked to the paradigms for 
constructive engagement between the state and non-state        
system: repression, bridging, harmonization, incorporation, and 
subsidization.101 These are not water-tight classifications and there 
can be overlap between the different types and strategies for dealing 
with legal pluralism. But it still remains a helpful model for 
understanding the relationship between the different legal systems. 
There is no guaranteed strategy for achieving gender equality, but 
certain strategies are better suited to certain environments. 
In situations defined by combative legal pluralism, the state 
and non-state justice systems are overtly hostile.102 Unsurprisingly, 
combative legal pluralism is commonly found in countries facing an 
active insurgency or separatist movement, like the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. In many instances, non-state justice forms a 
cornerstone of those attempts to challenge the state’s authority.103 
The state has to demonstrate its appeal as an effective, credible 
dispute resolution venue committed to a just legal order and the 
protection of human rights. Subsidization seeks to increase the 
capacity, performance, and popularity of state justice.104 It can take a 
wide variety of forms. Certain core techniques tend to recur, most 
notably legislative reform, capacity building, construction of physical 
infrastructure, and increased symbolic representation and public 
engagement.105  Subsidization can be a problematic approach when 
the state justice system is corrupt. At the same time, it is necessary 
in situations of combative legal pluralism to repress the state’s 
judicial rivals. Repression seeks to eliminate the state’s judicial 
rivals.106 If the state has sufficient capacity, this can take the form of 
prohibiting non-state justice forums. Almost invariably, however, 
repression entails significant violence and is fraught with risks of 
reciprocal violence. For example, in Afghanistan, both the state and 
Taliban justice sectors are attempting to destroy each other. 
Repression should not be taken as adopting an abolitionist approach 
to legal pluralism. Moreover, as it almost always implies the use of 
                                                                                                                                        
100.  Id. at 4, 12. 
101.  Id. at 80. 
102.  Id. at 73. 
103.  See STATHIS KALYVAS, THE LOGIC OF VIOLENCE IN CIVIL WAR 218–
19 (2006). 
104.  See Swenson, supra note 99, at 88–91. 
105.  Id. at 81. 
106.  Id. at 91. 
130 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [48.1:1 
force, it is not a feasible strategy for a human rights treaty body to 
recommend. Other branches of non-state justice unrelated to the 
insurgency remain a major feature of the post-conflict legal 
landscape. 
Competitive legal pluralism is the default setting in most 
post-conflict environments. 107  Competitive legal pluralism features 
significant, often deep, tensions between state and non-state legal 
systems, but these tensions rarely endanger the state’s overarching, 
formal, legal supremacy.108 Competitive legal systems most frequently 
take the form of legal order rooted in religious beliefs or shared 
cultures, customs, or heritages that do not necessarily reflect the 
state’s values.109 Both bridging and harmonization strategies can be 
beneficial in competitive legal pluralism. Bridging seeks to allocate 
cases between the state and non-state justice systems. The state 
needs to establish coordination and referral mechanisms. 110  Local 
leaders should receive training on the state system and understand 
how to access and navigate both legal systems. Bridging can be a 
successful strategy when there is a local interest or demand for state 
justice. Since bridging does reduce the autonomy of the state, it is 
crucial that non-state justice actors are willing to work with state 
authorities. Harmonization seeks to transform the non-state justice 
legal norms and decisions to be consistent with the state system’s 
core values.111 Gender equality is often a major priority.112 Ensuring a 
constitutional guarantee of equality and training on gender equality 
for non-state actors is an important first step. It is also constructive 
to promote internal reform by empowering women to question and 
modify non-state justice laws. 
In cooperative legal pluralist environments, non-state judicial 
authorities retain autonomy and authority, but are usually open to 
working together towards shared goals. 113  Major clashes between 
state and non-state actors are far less frequent and do not focus on 
existential issues of state judicial power. 114  Cooperative legal 
pluralism flourishes in places where progress is being made towards 
consolidating legitimate state authority. Alongside bridging and 
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harmonization, incorporation can be a constructive strategy in 
cooperative legal pluralism. Under incorporation, non-state justice is 
placed under formal, if not actual, authority of the state. 115 
Incorporation can take the form of religious or customary courts or 
the designation of non-state justice actors as courts of first instance. 
Alternatively, the non-state system could be subject to appeal or 
ratification by state officials. 116  This strategy is more likely to be 
successful when there is a higher functioning state system and strong 
positive relations between the actors in the state and non-state 
justice systems. 
Complementary legal pluralism is when state authorities do 
not face a meaningful challenge from non-state actors, which is rarely 
found in post-conflict states.117 There are no guarantees for success, 
but attention to the types of legal pluralism and making 
recommendations based on the intricate relationship between the 
state and non-state justice sector increases the likelihood of the state 
achieving gender equality. As the next section highlights, CEDAW 
has an important role to play in promoting women’s rights in each of 
these contexts. 
 
IV. THE ROLE OF CEDAW 
On its face, CEDAW is not a particularly promising 
instrument to address the challenges of legal pluralism as it contains 
no specific substantive obligations on gender equality during         
post-conflict reconstruction. A careful analysis of the text, however, 
demonstrates an implicit commitment to address the relationship 
between gender and legal pluralism in post-conflict environments. It 
is imperative to uncover this commitment because of the important 
role CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee can play in shaping both 
international and domestic rebuilding efforts. 
A. CEDAW’s Approach to Legal Pluralism and Post-Conflict 
CEDAW was not specifically designed to address conflict or 
post-conflict state-building, nor is there any connection drawn among 
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gender equality, legal pluralism and post-conflict environments.118 It 
was drafted in the 1960s and 1970s in response to the failure of the 
mainstream human rights instruments in addressing discrimination 
against women. State representatives who participated in the 
drafting process were often far-removed from post-conflict realities. 
There are three references to conflict in CEDAW’s preamble. First, 
states emphasize that the eradication of aggression, foreign 
occupation, domination, and interference in the internal affairs of 
states are essential to women’s rights. 119  Second, the preamble 
affirms that it is necessary to strengthen international peace to 
achieve gender equality. And third, states are “convinced that the full 
and complete development of a country, the welfare of the world and 
the cause of peace require the maximum participation of 
women . . . in all fields.” The links between gender equality and 
conflict established in the preamble did not translate into any 
substantive provisions. There is no reference to post-conflict 
situations in either the preamble or the body of CEDAW. 
Unlike its inattention to conflict and post-conflict scenarios, 
the substantive text of CEDAW is alive to the implications of legal 
pluralism for gender equality. Article 2 delineates the state’s core 
obligations and requires states to “modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women.” It has been argued that this requires states that 
have plural legal systems to amend or repeal laws regardless of their 
source—state or non-state—that discriminate against women.120 In a 
similar vein, Article 15 guarantees women’s equality before the law 
and access to justice.121 This provision should be interpreted broadly 
to include both state and non-state justice systems.122 Goonesekere, 
for example, observes that Article 15 could potentially be used in 
connection with responses to conflict, but this connection remains 
unexplored.123 
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Although CEDAW was not formulated to address post-conflict 
situations, an analysis of the text demonstrates that it holds 
significant potential. CEDAW aims to eliminate discrimination 
against women and achieve gender equality. The treaty “focuses on 
discrimination against women, emphasizing that women have 
suffered and continue to suffer from various forms of discrimination 
because they are women.”124 Under CEDAW, the state is required to 
ensure women’s equality in public life, before the law, in rural areas, 
in education, employment, health care, family life and socio-economic 
life.125 Unlike other U.N. human rights treaties, CEDAW also has 
provisions on negative cultural attitudes and stereotypes on the roles 
of men and women.126 
A purposive reading demonstrates CEDAW’s commitment to 
ensuring gender equality in all areas of life, not just those explicitly 
referred to in the treaty. Article 1 of CEDAW defines discrimination 
against women as any distinction that restricts women’s rights in 
“political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.”127 Article 
2 requires states to eliminate discrimination in “all forms,” while 
Article 3 refers to women’s full advancement and development in “all 
fields.” Through these open-textured provisions, CEDAW “anticipates 
the emergence of new forms of discrimination that had not been 
identified at the time of drafting.” 128  The CEDAW Committee 
observes that the treaty “covers other rights that are not explicitly 
mentioned in the Convention, but that have an impact on the 
achievement of equality . . . which impact represents a form of 
discrimination against women.” 129  CEDAW is an evolutionary 
instrument130 and is meant to be responsive to the evolving nature of 
discrimination against women and gender discrimination.131 As the 
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understanding develops on how different harms, such as post-conflict 
scenarios, are connected to gender and human rights, the broad and 
flexible conception of equality and non-discrimination in CEDAW can 
be interpreted to account for these changes. The CEDAW Committee 
notes that “[p]rotecting women’s human rights at all times, advancing 
substantive gender equality, before, during and after conflict . . . are 
important objectives of the Convention.”132 
B. CEDAW’s Potential Contribution to Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction 
CEDAW does not distinguish between conflict and            
post-conflict and lacks nuance in its understanding of non-state 
justice, but it retains the potential to meaningfully address the 
challenges women face in legally pluralistic post-conflict states. 
However, it is fair to ask: does it matter if CEDAW is sensitized and 
responsive to gender discrimination and inequality in legally 
pluralistic post-conflict states? Other high profile instruments on 
women and conflict such as U.N. Security Council Resolutions 
already address women, peace and security.133 However, CEDAW’s 
status as the pre-eminent international legal body on women’s rights 
and its multi-faceted accountability structures allow it to shine the 
international legal spotlight on the needs of women in post-conflict 
reconstruction.134 
International treaties are legally binding commitments. 
CEDAW, however, has an accountability structure different from 
domestic state courts. Every four years the state is required to submit 
a report detailing the progress it has made in implementing the 
treaty. This report is reviewed by the CEDAW Committee, an 
independent body of twenty-three experts in gender equality.135 The 
state’s report is supplemented with shadow reports from civil society 
organizations. After a written and oral dialogue session, the CEDAW 
Committee releases its Concluding Observations, where it highlights 
the state’s improvements, expresses concerns where CEDAW has not 
been fully implemented, and provides recommendations to ensure 
greater gender equality within the state. The Concluding 
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Observations have no legal status and the state is not bound to 
implement them. The work of the CEDAW Committee in the 
Concluding Observations is supplemented in three other 
accountability forums: the Individual Communications, the Inquiry 
Procedure and the General Recommendations, which also are not 
legally binding. Under the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, the CEDAW 
Committee can decide individual petitions that the state has not 
upheld its CEDAW obligations and it can conduct inquiries into grave 
and systemic abuses of women’s rights.136 It synthesizes the insights 
from the Concluding Observations, Individual Communications and 
Inquiry Procedure in the General Recommendations. 
The accountability mechanisms under CEDAW have resulted 
in a rich jurisprudence on gender equality. Notwithstanding its    
non-binding status, CEDAW sets international standards eliminating 
discrimination against women and achieving gender equality and the 
CEDAW Committee provides authoritative guidance on how to 
implement these standards.137 Engle observes that a “critical feature 
of the CEDAW process is its cultural and educational role: its 
capacity to coalesce and express a particular cultural understanding 
of gender.”138 Since CEDAW is one of the most widely ratified treaties 
in the world, it can, through its accountability mechanisms, draw 
world-wide attention to pressing issues of gender equality in legally 
pluralistic, post-conflict states.139 
CEDAW can also play a transformative role in the domestic 
jurisprudence on gender equality.140 The standards developed at the 
international level can influence and empower civil society and grass 
roots organizations, courts, policy-makers and legislators in creating 
and implementing domestic responses to gender inequality. The work 
and advocacy of the CEDAW Committee on gender-based violence is a 
particularly good example of international law’s potential to 
constructively influence the domestic sphere. Numerous apex courts 
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around the world including South Africa, Canada, India, and the 
European Court of Human Rights have relied upon and cited the 
General Recommendation on violence against women.141 CEDAW and 
the work of the CEDAW Committee have also been used by various 
law reform commissions. 142  The CEDAW Committee can feed into 
domestic debates on how to ensure women’s rights in post-conflict 
rebuilding. 
There is great value in analyzing how the CEDAW Committee 
can approach legal pluralism in post-conflict scenarios in a 
sophisticated manner. There is no direct or guaranteed route for 
ensuring that CEDAW or the guidance provided by the CEDAW 
Committee is followed by the state. But the CEDAW Committee’s 
ability to influence domestic norms is limited when its 
recommendations are generic or ignore the complexity of legal 
relations that exist in post-conflict states. A serious dialogue is 
essential. The CEDAW Committee’s recommendations are most 
compelling when its monitoring is persuasive to its targeted audience. 
An approach to legal pluralism in post-conflict scenarios that is alive 
to the different challenges women face in each particular legally 
pluralistic state and does not adopt a categorical approach holds 
greater opportunity to offer authoritative guidance. 
 
V. CEDAW COMMITTEE’S APPROACH TO LEGAL PLURALISM IN  
POST-CONFLICT STATES 
Analyzing the CEDAW Committee’s approach to gender 
equality in legally pluralistic post-conflict states reveals that it has 
an under-developed understanding of the challenges and at times 
adopts a subtly abolitionist approach to non-state justice. The 
CEDAW Committee consistently acknowledges the state’s limited 
capacity and the prevalence of non-state justice in the General 
Recommendations and Concluding Observations for Afghanistan and 
Timor-Leste.143 However, it is insufficient to simply note that legal 
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pluralism exists and that it has consequences for realizing women’s 
rights. The CEDAW Committee needs to assess the type of legal 
pluralism that exists in the post-conflict state and make 
recommendations specifically targeted towards embedding a 
commitment to gender equality in each unique context. This section 
analyses the relevant General Recommendations and publicly 
available material from the state periodic reporting process from 
Afghanistan and Timor-Leste to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses in the CEDAW Committee’s current approach. It does not 
examine material under the OP-CEDAW, as there have been no 
individual communications or inquiry procedures that touch upon 
gender equality in legally pluralistic post-conflict states. 
A. General Recommendations 
The CEDAW Committee has more consistently addressed 
legal pluralism outside of post-conflict reconstruction. Regarding the 
economic consequences of marriage and family life, the CEDAW 
Committee identifies non-state justice as a site for discrimination 
against women144 and it takes a strong abolitionist approach. 145  It 
holds that “identity-based personal status laws and customs 
perpetuate discrimination against women and that the preservation 
of multiple legal systems is in itself discriminatory against women.”146 
The CEDAW Committee recommends that states adopt personal 
status laws that provide for equality for women “irrespective of their 
religious or ethnic identity or community . . . .”147 This approach to 
non-state justice has been criticized as positioning “‘culture’ and 
‘rights’ as polar opposites.”148 
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Only recently did the CEDAW Committee release a General 
Recommendation on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and     
post-conflict situations.149 At the outset, there are terminology issues. 
First, the General Recommendations refer to non-state justice as 
informal justice. As discussed in Section I, “informal” implies that 
non-state justice is transient, piece-meal, and unorganized, when in 
reality it can be highly disciplined, organized, and deeply established 
in the legal framework of the state. Second, the CEDAW Committee 
also appears confused on the nature of non-state justice. When it 
expresses concerns about the impact of legal pluralism on gender 
equality in eleven recommendations it makes, five focus on 
transitional justice. The inter-mingling of transitional and non-state 
justice is problematic as they are conceptually distinct. Transitional 
justice is “largely backwards looking . . . with forward-looking 
goals.” 150  It involves “extraordinary measures” surrounding regime 
change or post-conflict reconstruction, while non-state justice focuses 
on “normal” and “day-to-day” delivery of justice. 151  The boundary 
between transitional and non-state justice is by no means absolute,152 
but the distinction remains useful for classifying different types of 
post-conflict legal initiatives. 
Terminology aside, the CEDAW Committee in the General 
Recommendation is inattentive to the different types of legal 
pluralism that exist in post-conflict environments and the impact the 
relationship between the state and non-state justice systems can have 
on gender equality. On the positive side, the CEDAW Committee 
highlights several relevant characteristics of accessing justice in   
post-conflict states noted in Section I. It recognizes that after a 
conflict “the formal justice system may no longer exist or function 
with any level of efficiency or effectiveness.” 153  The challenge for 
women to access justice is even further exacerbated because the state 
justice system is “often more likely to violate women’s rights than to 
protect them.” 154  The CEDAW Committee observes that the state 
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institutions may be so weak “that certain government functions may 
be performed by non-State groups.” 155  It notes that for women in   
post-conflict states the non-state justice system may be the only 
available option.156 It has a realistic assessment of the nature and role 
of non-state justice. The General Recommendation explicitly holds 
that non-state justice can be a “valuable tool in the aftermath of the 
conflict,” which is very different from the position it took on non-state 
justice in relation to family life.157 At the same time, the CEDAW 
Committee recognizes non-state justice can discriminate against 
women. It recommends careful consideration of the role of non-state 
justice “in facilitating access to justice for women.”158 
The CEDAW Committee makes a series of recommendations 
on how to strengthen gender equality in legally pluralistic,           
post-conflict states. The state has an obligation under Article 2 of 
CEDAW to take appropriate measures to ensure that non-state actors 
do not discriminate against women. 159  It further develops what it 
means by “appropriate measures” and relies on several of the 
strategies described in Section III: (i) it draws on the bridging 
strategy and recommends that not all complaints be adjudicated in 
non-state justice forums; (ii) it argues for incorporation and holds 
that there should be a right to appeal any decision from the non-state 
justice sector to the state justice sector; (iii) building upon the 
harmonization model, the CEDAW Committee recommends that 
there should be dialogue between the state and non-state actors with 
the aim of reforming the non-state justice sector to make it consistent 
with CEDAW; and (iv) with respect to subsidization and building the 
capacity of the state justice sector, it counsels that states should 
provide legal aid and create mobile courts for rural areas. 
While these recommendations are all critical to eliminating 
discrimination against women, it is problematic that the General 
Recommendation does not appreciate the relationship between 
different strategies or recommendations and the types of legal 
pluralism in post-conflict states. Recommending training for         
non-state justice officials who are actively seeking to undermine and 
overthrow the state justice sector is illogical. Nor is there any 
appreciation that arguing for enhanced state capacity or ensuring a 
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final right of appeal to the state system might negatively impact the 
non-state system. Recommendations to limit the role of non-state 
justice could be perceived as an attempt to erode its role and 
autonomy and turn non-state actors against constructive engagement 
with the state in ensuring gender equality. Recommendations on 
addressing discrimination against women in legally pluralistic society 
made without appreciating the specific context can jeopardize the 
rebuilding process. In monitoring states’ implementation of CEDAW 
it is inherently necessary to appreciate how recommendations in 
respect of one justice sector will impact the other justice systems in 
the state. 
The General Recommendation provides broad guidance and 
deals with many complicated issues of gender equality in conflict and 
post-conflict settings. It is not necessarily appropriate that it go into 
detail on the types of legal pluralism and related constructive 
strategies. However, it would improve the authoritativeness and 
persuasiveness of the General Recommendation if it acknowledged 
that legal pluralism in each post-conflict state raises distinctive 
challenges, and that measures taken to achieve gender equality need 
to be cognizant of the nature of both state and non-state justice and 
the relationship between the different justice sectors. 
B. The State Periodic Reporting Process 
The state periodic reporting process provides an opportunity 
to thoroughly examine the relationship between the state and       
non-state justice sector. It is imperative that the CEDAW Committee 
approaches the Concluding Observations with sophistication and 
cultural awareness, as it is a chance to be influential in its guidance 
to both state and international actors involved in the rebuilding 
process. In practice, however, the CEDAW Committee overlooks the 
intricacies of the relationship between state and non-state justice and 
adopts an implicit abolitionist approach to non-state justice. This 
subsection assesses the publicly available material from the state 
reporting process for Timor-Leste and Afghanistan. Timor-Leste has 
reported twice on its implementation of CEDAW and the CEDAW 
Committee released Concluding Observations in 2009 and 2015. 
Afghanistan has submitted one state report and the CEDAW 
Committee released Concluding Observations on Afghanistan in 
2013. 
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1. Timor-Leste 
In Timor-Leste, the state and non-state justice systems have, 
by and large, worked together constructively and progressed from 
competitive towards co-operative legal pluralism. Powerful non-state 
justice actors are committed to working with the state.160 Elections for 
positions in the non-state justice system have been particularly 
important in this process and have offered women a substantial voice 
in the local justice sector, as well as a being a vital local 
accountability mechanism. 161  Non-state justice continues to be      
well-respected and highly autonomous, as well as the predominant 
form of dispute resolution.162 
While the CEDAW Committee indicates that it is “fully aware 
of the vast challenges confronting a newly independent state,” it does 
not demonstrate a keen awareness to the challenges and 
opportunities of legal pluralism in Timor-Leste. 163  It begins by 
identifying “the persistence of traditional justice systems” as a barrier 
to women accessing justice.164 This characterization implies that the 
existence of non-state justice per se violates CEDAW. Perhaps 
consequentially, the CEDAW Committee adopts subsidization 
strategies. All of the recommendations to address gender inequality 
in the non-state system are focused on improving the quality and 
capacity of the state system. During the oral dialogue session, the 
CEDAW Committee specifically asks about the steps Timor-Leste is 
taking to improve the quality of state justice.165 More specifically, it 
recommends that Timor-Leste encourage women to report cases of 
violence to the police and ensure that these cases are not directed to 
mediation by the formal or informal justice system. 166  It further 
encourages the state to ensure that “land law does not defer to the 
traditional system.”167  The state should provide legal aid services, 
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disseminate information on the legal system, and train state officials 
in the principles of gender equality.168 
These recommendations are suited for combative legal 
pluralism where the systems are opposed to each other. Given that 
Timor-Leste has achieved co-operative legal pluralism, it is surprising 
that the CEDAW Committee does not see value in bridging or 
harmonizing approaches. None of the CEDAW Committee’s 
recommendations seek to improve gender equality within the        
non-state justice system. For instance, Timor-Leste is not encouraged 
to reach out to non-state actors to dialogue with or raise awareness 
on the importance of upholding CEDAW. Nor is there any focus on 
empowering or training women so that they are in a position to 
internally reform traditional land systems to better protect women’s 
rights. Ignoring the potential opportunities to embed gender equality 
in non-state justice is particularly disheartening as many non-state 
justice leaders have expressed a desire to learn more, specifically 
about the status of gender-based violence as public crime under state 
law.169 This is not to say that the CEDAW Committee is wrong in 
recommending that gender-based violence needs to be treated as a 
crime within the state system, that traditional inheritance laws need 
to be reformed, or that the quality and capacity of the state justice 
needs to be enhanced. Rather, making these recommendations in 
isolation from the relationship the state has to the non-state justice 
sector and the openness of the non-state justice sector to human 
rights means the CEDAW Committee misses out on a chance to make 
persuasive recommendations that speak to the reality of accessing 
justice in Timor-Leste. 
2. Afghanistan 
With respect to Afghanistan, the CEDAW Committee strongly 
prefers the state system and glosses over the complex relationship 
between state and non-state justice. 170  Consequently, its 
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recommendations are divorced from the reality of achieving gender 
equality in Afghanistan. Non-state justice in Afghanistan is       
multi-faceted as it includes both the Taliban and local tribal leaders 
who resolve disputes through their own accountability mechanisms: 
jirgas and shuras. These groups have very different relations to the 
state justice sector. The Taliban is actively seeking to overthrow the 
state—combative legal pluralism—while local tribal leaders remain 
highly skeptical of working with the state, but are not trying to 
supplant it—competitive legal pluralism. Divergent approaches to 
these different non-state justice sectors are needed, yet the CEDAW 
Committee’s Concluding Observations do not draw this necessary 
distinction. 
In the periodic reporting process, the CEDAW Committee 
recommendations are ill-suited to the circumstances, again reflecting 
the lack of attention to the nuances of legal pluralism. For example, 
during the oral and written dialogue sessions, the CEDAW 
Committee repeatedly encouraged the state to harmonize the        
non-state justice system with CEDAW. 171  Problematically, the 
CEDAW Committee did not distinguish between the different types of 
legal pluralism. However, against a backdrop of combative legal 
pluralism, training Taliban leaders on women’s rights seems 
impracticable, as Taliban justice seeks to overthrow the state and 
overtly rejects the fundamental premise of CEDAW. Rather than 
recommend such an impractical goal, the CEDAW Committee should 
recognize that certain types of legal pluralism need to be prohibited. 
A harmonization approach could be a constructive strategy in 
Afghanistan, but only when dealing with local tribal leaders. 
Religious and community leaders are understandably suspicious of 
the state. A harmonization approach that recognizes and respects 
their autonomy and cultural beliefs while simultaneously promoting 
gender equality has a good chance of being successful. In the 
Concluding Observations, the CEDAW Committee recommended that 
the state raise awareness among religious and community leaders on 
gender equality.172 However, this falls short of a true harmonization 
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approach, as the remainder of the recommendations leave very little 
scope for non-state justice. 
The recommendations focus on limiting the extent and 
authority of non-state justice. The CEDAW Committee relies on the 
subsidization strategy and encourages Afghanistan to enhance the 
quality of state justice by increasing women’s access to the state 
justice system and sensitizing state officials on the importance of 
addressing the violations of women’s rights, including gender-based 
violence, through the state system.173 Subsidization is seemingly an 
ideal strategy for combative legal pluralism, but is less so when the 
state is weak and corrupt, as is the case in Afghanistan. The CEDAW 
Committee also uses the incorporation strategy and recommends that 
the state ensure women can appeal decisions of the non-state justice 
mechanisms to the state justice system. 174  This approach is most 
effective when non-state justice actors are constructively engaging 
with the state. Without the support of non-state actors, incorporating 
the non-state into the state system can be perceived as a direct threat 
to the continuous functioning of the non-state system. It is unlikely to 
be successful in Afghanistan, where there is a high degree of mistrust 
and competition between the state and local tribal leaders. Finally, 
the CEDAW Committee’s use of a bridging strategy encourages 
Afghanistan to restrict the non-state justice system from addressing 
serious violations of human rights.175 
Achieving gender equality in Afghanistan is a substantial 
task. In the oral dialogue session, the state representatives 
highlighted significant security concerns that limit the reach of the 
state justice system.176 There are no perfect solutions, and various 
measures are required, including addressing corruption in the state 
system, educating local tribal leaders on gender equality, and limiting 
or removing the threat posed by the Taliban. However, because the 
CEDAW Committee does not correctly diagnose the multiple forms of 
legal pluralism that exist in Afghanistan, and does not appreciate the 
character and role of legal pluralism, the CEDAW Committee’s 
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recommendations, at worst, risk undermining efforts to establish 
gender equality and are, at best, irrelevant.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD 
Advancing women’s rights after conflict requires constructive 
engagement with non-state judicial actors. Unfortunately, the 
CEDAW Committee’s approach to legal pluralism lacks nuance. 
Theories developed in international relations on non-state justice 
highlight its overly simplistic approach to the complexity of non-state 
justice in legal pluralistic, post-conflict states. In the General 
Recommendation, the CEDAW Committee indicates that there are 
numerous measures that could be taken to ensure women are able to 
access justice. Based on the case studies of Afghanistan and      
Timor-Leste, these insights have not been incorporated into the 
periodic reporting process. In the Concluding Observations used in 
this analysis, the focus of the CEDAW Committee’s recommendations 
is upon strengthening the reach, capacity, and quality of state justice. 
For the most part, it ignores constructive engagement with non-state 
justice. More troubling, in both the General Recommendation and 
Concluding Observations, the CEDAW Committee is not cognizant of 
the different types of legal pluralism that exist. As a consequence, it 
recommends strategies that are unlikely to be successful, as they are 
divorced from the reality of the complex relationship between state 
and non-state justice. In sum, the CEDAW Committee approaches 
legal pluralism in post-conflict states without sufficient contextual 
understanding of the interlocking forces at play in the reconstruction 
process. 
There are two intertwined and compelling explanations for 
the CEDAW Committee’s incoherent and heavy-handed approach. 
First, is the knowledge gap inherent in the periodic reporting process. 
CEDAW only directly applies to states and the CEDAW Committee 
cannot directly engage with actors in the non-state justice sector. 
Civil society organizations can act as a potential bridge by providing 
shadow reports to the CEDAW Committee. However, they may have 
their own bias in reporting and either overlook, minimize, or 
mischaracterize non-state justice. It is a real challenge for the 
CEDAW Committee to have an accurate picture of the de facto 
obstacles to women’s rights. Second, the CEDAW Committee lacks 
the necessary theoretical understanding of legal pluralism. 
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Although it might be tempting, it would be wrong to dismiss 
the role of CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee in achieving gender 
equality in legal pluralistic, post-conflict states because its current 
approach is underdeveloped. CEDAW’s role as the preeminent treaty 
on women’s rights and the significant ability of the CEDAW 
Committee to guide state action and influence the policies and 
programs of domestic and international civil society organizations 
involved in post-conflict rebuilding means it is imperative that it 
approach access to justice in a sophisticated manner. Swenson’s legal 
pluralism typologies discussed in Section III and the corresponding 
strategies tailored to each specific typology can address the 
theoretical gap in the CEDAW Committee’s current approach. The 
paradigms and strategies on legal pluralism offer a sophisticated 
contextual framework that the CEDAW Committee can employ when 
monitoring states. It can use this framework to direct its inquiry in 
the oral and written dialogue session to redress the knowledge gap 
and gain the information necessary to properly classify the type of 
legal pluralism that exists in the state. It can then draw on the 
tailored strategies to propose the most appropriate measures to 
achieve gender equality in light of the nature of legal pluralism in the 
specific state. For example, it can recommend in Timor-Leste that the 
state pursue a harmonization and bridging approach and encourage 
the state to constructively engage with non-state actors to promote 
women’s rights in all legal systems within the state. In Afghanistan, 
the CEDAW Committee can use the proposed theoretical framework 
to more accurately diagnose the various types of non-state justice. It 
can then recommend that the state undertake measures to contain 
Taliban justice while it can work at educating tribal and community 
justice leaders on the value and importance of women’s rights. With a 
more refined and rigorous approach to legal pluralism, CEDAW and 
the CEDAW Committee can become a more authoritative voice to 
ensure that the opportunities to achieve gender equality in           
post-conflict states are realized. 
 
